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98 Both markets and governments fail. Government intervention is most often advo-
cated in order to correct market failures but government officials can use state 
power to achieve different goals: help friends, families, cronies, and political con-
stituents. When this occurs, the government can do serious damage in the financial 
system. 
The World Bank's first-ever Global Financial Development Report re-examines a 
basic question highlighted by the crisis: what is the proper role of the state in fi-
nancial development? In the Report the state includes not only the country’s go-
vernment but also autonomous or semiautonomous agencies such as a central 
bank or a financial supervision agency. As it is usually the case with World Bank 
publications, the Report is very user-friendly. It is organized in five chapters and 
each of them has the main messages highlighted at the beginning. Moreover, there 
is an ‟Overview” that summarizes the whole Report. The publication also has an 
accompanying website (http://www.worldbank.org/financialdevelopment) that 
contains new datasets and research papers.
What are the main messages highlighted by the authors in the Report? Firstly, 
there should be caution when it comes to the state's role in financial development. 
Active state involvement may be helpful in the short run but there is also evidence 
of potential longer-term negative effects. The state has an important role in provi-
ding supervision, ensuring healthy competition and strengthening financial infra-
structure, but direct interventions are less welcome. Secondly, incentives are cru-
cial in the financial sector. Policies aimed at the financial sector should better align 
private incentives with public interest without taxing or subsidising private risk-
taking. Thirdly, when it comes to regulation and supervision, the basic ingredient 
is a solid, transparent and not too complex institutional framework. Supervisory 
action should be strong, timely and anticipatory.
Fourthly, competition is good; it can improve efficiency and enhance access to 
financial services without necessarily undermining financial stability. Instead of 
restricting competition, it is necessary to deal with distorted competition, improve 
the flow of information, and strengthen the contractual environment. The state 
should encourage contestability through the healthy entry of well-capitalized and 
the timely exit of insolvent institutions. Fifth, lending by state-owned banks can 
play a positive role in stabilizing aggregate credit in a downturn, but it can also 
lead to resource misallocation and deterioration of the quality of intermediation 
due to the serving of political interests. Oversight of state banks is challenging, 
especially in weak institutional environments. Finally, the state’s role can be use-
ful in promoting transparency of information and reducing counterparty risk, par-
ticularly when there are significant monopoly rents that discourage information 
sharing. These are the common lessons and guidelines but appropriate policies 
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99The Report makes it clear that the main reasons, besides macroeconomic factors, 
behind the global financial crisis were major regulatory and supervisory failures. 
The main weakness in the pre-crisis approach was that it focused on risks to indi-
vidual institutions and did not sufficiently take into account systemic risk. The 
second weakness was that regulation and supervision of banks, insurance and se-
curities markets was not complemented by strong oversight at the financial group 
level. This enabled transactions to be carried through entities that were subject to 
weaker regulation, or even to completely avoid regulation. Third, some regula-
tions were poorly designed, for example the Basel capital adequacy measures con-
siderably misrepresented the solvency of banks. Fourth, implementation of the 
rules was constrained by the capacity and incentives of regulators and supervisors. 
Financial institutions grew too complex and became interconnected. Some regu-
lators lacked independence and others found it difficult to resist pressures and 
temptations coming from the financial industry.
Common features of non-crisis countries were: a more stringent definition of ca-
pital, higher capital levels, and a less complex regulatory framework. They had 
stricter auditing procedures, limits on related party exposures and asset classifica-
tion standards. In addition their supervisors were more likely to require sharehol-
ders to support distressed banks with new equity. Furthermore, non-crisis coun-
tries were also characterized by better quality of financial information and greater 
incentive to use that information – among other reasons because they had relati-
vely less generous deposit insurance coverage. 
The Report stresses that ‟finance is central to development”. In other words, ‟fi-
nance matters, both when it functions well and when it functions poorly”. Almost 
the same message was given in the Foreword of another World Bank (2001) report 
published more than a decade ago. The authors of both reports claim that finance 
causes economic growth and even though they acknowledge that there are diffe-
rent opinions on this issue, the references they quote are from the last century (e.g. 
Lucas, 1988; and Robinson, 1952). The authors ignore a vast recent literature that 
casts doubt on finance as an engine of growth (for a literature review see Bađun, 
2009). 
Researchers working at the World Bank must be given a lot of credit for collecting 
and organizing data in a new Global Financial Development Database (available 
online), which is a great supplement to previously released Financial Deve-
lopment and Structure Dataset. The former has data organized in four main cate-
gories: financial depth, access, efficiency, and stability. It shows that financial sy-
stems widely differ.
Even though conclusions and policies from the Report seem straightforward, an 
impression stays that it is all easier said than done. The introductory sentence from 
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100 98, the potentially disastrous consequences of weak financial markets are appa-
rent”. The dust has still not settled from the last financial crisis, far from it, but the 
mere fact that it happened again shows that John Steinbeck was partly right when 
in The Grapes of Wrath he wrote: ‟The bank is something more than men, I tell 
you. It’s the monster. Men made it, but they can’t control it.” However, the same 
could be said about government. 
It seems that the relationship between government and banks/financial sector will 
always be strong because history shows that crises are inherent to the financial 
sector, which means that bankers will always be looking for a safety net and re-
scue  by the government. In addition, bankers have a vested interest in promoting 
government deficits, which they finance and earn interest on that. Furthermore, 
the government has a constant conflict of interest since it both regulates banks and 
uses them as a source of finance. Also, government officials are not benevolent 
social planners and they will try, if not prevented by law, to maximize their own 
wealth, not social welfare. Finally, banks can capture the regulators. In the end, 
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